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Using model checking in the design of a sensor network protocol
Ivaylo Valkov Alice Miller
University of Glasgow
Abstract: We investigate how the PRISM and Alloy model checkers can be used in the design of a sensor
network communication protocol. We introduce the two model checkers and illustrate how Alloy can be used
to specify and analyse an existing communication protocol WirelessHART. We then propose how PRISM and
Alloy will be used in the design of a new protocol, Ctrl-MAC, which is currently being developed as part of
an EPSRC funded program grant, S4: Science of Sensor System Software. The aim is to exploit the strengths
of each approach to allow us to select parameters and configurations to optimise the protocol.
1 Introduction
Testing is the most commonly used method for validation
of software systems. However testing alone can not pro-
vide guarantees of complex system behaviour. Concurrent
systems, such as communication protocols, are particularly
hard to verify using testing. In such systems we want to
prove temporal properties such as: “when a message is sent
it will eventually arrive at its destination”, or “if a message
is sent from a component then it will receive an acknowl-
edgement before the timeout period has elapsed”.
Formal methods are commonly used for the verification
of software and hardware systems. They comprise a range
of techniques based on mathematics and logical reasoning,
and are important in the creation of more robust and reli-
able systems. One such technique is model checking. We
propose using model checking in the design of a new sen-
sor network protocol. We can identify and prove properties
of the protocol as it is developed - and adjust parameters
accordingly. This differs from the common use in which
properties of an existing protocol are verified, with no op-
tion to modify the protocol.
2 Model checking
Model checking is the process of creating a formal model
of a software or hardware system and then using a soft-
ware tool, called a model checker, to automate the search
for proofs of or counterexamples to some properties of the
system. The syntax and structure of the model that is being
created depends on the choice of model checker, as each
model checker relates a model to the underlying logical rea-
soning and logical concepts in a different way.
PRISM [5] is a probabilistic model checker that allows
for the verification of a number of Markov chain variants,
like Discrete Time Markov Chains (DTMCs) and Markov
Decision Processes (MDPs). It has been used to formally
verify quantitative properties of many network protocols in-
cluding the device discovery phase of Bluetooth [2] and the
CSMA/CA mechanism of the 802.15.4 based Zigbee stan-
dard [3].
The Alloy Analyzer (Alloy) is a model checker that uses
a simple and powerful first-order logic language for spec-
ifying models which are then analysed with off-the-shelf
SAT solvers. This allows models to be created in an it-
erative and incremental manner: they can be verified, in-
spected, evaluated and modified during multiple iterations.
Furthermore, Alloy allows the configuration of the setting
on which properties are being verified to be easily changed.
For example, in the context of protocol analysis, models are
often confined to a small fixed number of devices, which
are placed in a particular configuration which should best
exhibit the property under verification. Using Alloy a fam-
ily of configurations can be analysed simultaneously.
Alloy has been used in the past to provide formal proofs
for a variety of network protocols and to find security flaws
in others. For example it has been used to formally verify
five web security mechanisms that relate to user-supplied
information [1]. In [4] Alloy is applied directly to model
web protocols in a novel security analysis technique. In
Section 3 we illustrate the use of Alloy for modelling an
existing wireless protocol and in Section 4 we propose its
use, along with PRISM, in the design of a new protocol.
3 An example: WirelessHART
We have investigated the use of Alloy for protocol analy-
sis within the context of an existing protocol, namely the
WirelessHART protocol, based on the IEEE 802.15.4 pro-
tocol standard.
WirelessHART is a short-range network protocol whose
main goal is to perform low-cost communications over a
network in such a way as to preserve battery life. It is a cen-
tralised protocol with one device acting as the personal area
network (PAN) coordinator for the network. The protocol
distinguishes between reduced function devices (RFDs),
that are only able to gather and send data, and full func-
tion devices (FFDs), that are capable of transferring data
from other nodes. All of the data is gathered at the PAN co-
ordinator, which must be an FFD. Fig 1 shows an example
of such a network.
As an illustration, we present below a small fragment
of Alloy in which we declare the basic entities (atoms) that
will be used in the model. These are referred to as signa-
tures (sig).
/ / There i s n ’ t a d e v i c e t h a t i s no t
/ / a RFD or FFD
ab s t r a c t s i g Device { }
/ / Dev i c e s are e i t h e r reduced f u n c t i o n
/ / or f u l l f u n c t i o n
s i g RFD, FFD ex tends Device { }
Figure 1: Network consisting of 3 FFDs and 4 RFDs. One
device is not connected to the network.
After specifying the types of devices that exist we need
to define how they relate in a network. To do so we cre-
ate a Network signature which contains a number of nested
relations. The connected relation is used to specify which
devices belong to a given network. This is particularly use-
ful when modelling scenarios where devices join or leave a
network.
s i g Network {
c o n n e c t e d : s e t Device ,
P a n C o o r d i n a t o r : FFD & connec t ed ,
managedBy : ( c o n n e c t e d − P a n C o o r d i n a t o r )
−> (FFD & c o n n e c t e d ) ,
/ / RFDs canno t r e c e i v e da ta
r e c e i v e F r o m : FFD −> Device
}{
/ / c onnec t ed d e v i c e s are r e a chab l e
/ / from t h e PanCoord ina tor
c o n n e c t e d i n P a n C o o r d i n a t o r .∗ r e c e i v e F r o m
/ / managedBy : i n v e r s e o f
/ / r ece i veFrom
managedBy = ˜ r e c e i v e F r o m
}
The PanCoordinator relation is used to specify a single
device which acts as a central device for the network. The
relations: managedBy and receiveFrom denote immediate
connections between two devices. Finally, the connected
relation defines that to be connected to a network a node
means to be reachable from the central node.
In order to ensure that devices cannot send data to them-
selves, we add an additional constraint to the model:
f a c t { a l l nw : Network | a l l d : Device |
d−>d n o t i n nw . r e c e i v e F r o m }
We can now use Alloy to generate an instance of this model
for a defined number and type of devices. Fig 1 is an ex-
ample of such an instance. Manual inspection demonstrates
that there are no self-related devices and that connected de-
vices are appropriately marked.
4 Model checking for sensor network protocol design
PRISM is an obvious formalism for modelling communi-
cation protocolols and our wirelessHART example demon-
strates the suitability of Alloy in this context. We propose to
model and analyse a wireless communications protocol that
is currently under development, in both PRISM and Alloy.
Ctrl-MAC is a sensor network communication protocol that
is being developed as part of the Science of Sensor Systems
Software (S4) project. This is an EPSRC-funded project
held by the University of Glasgow with the Universities of
St Andrews and Liverpool and Imperial College. Ctrl-MAC
is similar to WirelessHart in that they both use time divi-
sion multiple access governed by a central gateway node.
Its main goal is to provide reliable communication within
a given time constraint for Cyber Physical Systems (CPS)
such as water distribution systems and electric grids. By
using model checking throughout the development of the
protocol we will inform its design by choosing parameters
and configurations to optimise performance.
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